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Abstract. This paper identifies the most important similarities between the four PIGS 
countries: Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain, in terms of principle macroeconomic indicators 
in the current crisis. This article also treats the principle transmission channels of sovereign 
risk and implicitly the financial crises. These transmission channels are the following: 
increase in sovereign bond yields, critically budgetary position, banks' exposures toward 
PIIGS economies and other states banks' exposures to sovereign debt of the PIIGS states. 
Studying the transmission channels of sovereign risk, results that, the European Framework is 
under institutional reform, but it should be improved in terms of instruments which quantify 
financial stability and crises prevention. 
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1. Introduction 
The financial crisis revealed the weaknesses tax of EU countries, bringing to the fore a 
concern for states known under the acronym PIIGS namely: Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece 
and Spain. The specific of these states is the critical fiscal position and its influence on 
financial stability framework. If we look at the crisis as a debt crisis, we can ignore Ireland, as 
Ireland's debt respected the convergence criteria, since the adoption of the Euro. Another 
criterion for differentiating Ireland from PIGS is the geographic coverage of the four countries 
(S, SW Europe), which facilitates trade development between them. 
Sovereign credit risk management has a significant impact on financial stability. Given 
this, we propose in this paper to analyze the main channels of contagion, that contributed to 
the spread of sovereign credit risk to identify similarities and differences of PIGS - Ireland 
that characterize these states, direction of spreading it among states, possibility to stop the 
financial crisis and potential ways of quantifying the stability/financial instability. 
According to the European Central Bank, to which we subscribe, there are various 
channels of contagion of sovereign credit risk. 
 
2. Channels of contagion of sovereign credit risk 
The first channel of contagion is deteriorating credit growth due to sovereign debt, 
which resulted in an increase in sovereign bond yields (ECB, 2010, 76 p.). 
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Source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 
Figure 1. The evolution of long-term bond yields in the PIIGS (2006-2012) 
 
As shown in Figure 1, performance bonds of Greece came in 2010 to 11.03, registering 
an increase of 73%. Spain's government bond yields increased moderately at start of the 
period 2006 to the third quarter of 2010. Portuguese bonds with a maturity of 30 years reached 
5.57 percentage points, an increase of 44% from recent lows. At the end of 2011 and the 
beginning of 2012, we assist to an improvement in terms of PIIGS economies bond yields, 
despite the fact that in some cases it’s still critical: Greece, Ireland and Portugal (Table 1, 
Appendix).  
The second channel of contagion is the tax namely the excessive deficits, which 
increase long-term interest rates and risk premiums leading to an increase in the cost of 
borrowing. 
 
 
Source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 
Figure 2. Evolution of the budget deficit in 2006-2011 (% in GDP) 
 
Increased sovereign vulnerability, states can translate into chronic budget deficits, 
which resulted in higher levels of debt default with worsening growth potential. Countries 
with weak fiscal position reached record double-digit deficits, Greece in 2009 reached a 
deficit of 15.6% of GDP, followed by Ireland with a deficit of 13.9% of GDP and 11.2% of 
GDP Spain. In terms of share in GDP, the public deficit of Ireland recorded a worsening again 
in 2010, reaching over 35% of GDP, followed by a decrease in 2011 (Table 2, Appendix). In 
other analyzed economies, we can observe an improvement of public deficit, but without 
touching the 3% target imposed by Maastricht Treaty. 
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Italy with a lower budget deficit of 5.4% of GDP is facing a very high public debt. 
Excessive deficits indicate the trend of rapid growth and increased vulnerability to debt 
financial position of a state. 
Another common feature of the four analyzed countries refer to high public debt 
respectively exceeds 100% of GDP in the second quarter of 2010 (148.3% of GDP Greece and 
Italy 119.2% of GDP, with such high tax risk government debt of Greece proves to be too 
large to be paid, one of the primary problems is that the international community lacks a 
framework to deal with such situations. In 2011, the succession of these five economies 
remains unchanged in terms of public debt. The higher public debt, bigger than 100% from 
GDP is presented by Greece (170.6% of GDP), Italy (120.7% of GDP), followed by Portugal 
(108.1% of GDP) and Ireland (106.4%) (Table 3, Appendix). Spain, Portugal faces a level 
high indebtedness of the private sector. Increase refinancing costs for the government means 
additional efforts and private sector debt refinancing, resulting spread fiscal problems in the 
private sector. 
 
 
Source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 
Figure 3. The evolution of public debt (% in GDP), 2006-2011 
 
The rapid growth of public debt and budget balance deterioration may compromise 
financial stability as sovereign shocks are transmitted to the banking system that can help to 
spread across borders. In this key task of central government is to design medium-term fiscal 
consolidation strategy aimed at clear shots debt mitigation and emergency response in 
deteriorating public budget. Transmission of sovereign risk on local banking systems and its 
effects on the real economy is a threat to global financial stability. 
The third channel of contagion could be through the banking system (Table 4, 
Appendix). Quantification of contamination can be achieved by analyzing banks' exposures 
toward four PIGS economies (Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain). As a result of financing 
difficulties faced by Greece tend to differentiate markets in the euro area banks' exposure 
criterion to these economies (IMF-a, 2010, p.  4). 
French and Dutch banks have significant exposures in the banking system in Spain. If 
not resume growth and not implementing fiscal consolidation measures, concerns will go on 
public finances of Spain. High interest rates in Spain can highlight the weaknesses of Spanish 
financial system. Savings banks, especially the "Cajas" face bad loans caused by deteriorating 
housing market and increased cost of funding. Concerns over the finances of a country may be 
transmitted to other financial systems. Exposures of banks in Belgium, Ireland and 
Netherlands to Italy and Spain are significant. Thus these states are extra vulnerable to 
worsening fiscal problems (Financial Stability Report, 2010, p. 23).  
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Table 1 
Banks' exposure level to the PIIGS (% GDP) in 2010 
 
 Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Total 
France 0-5 0-5 15-20 0-5 5-10 33 
Germany 0-5 5-10 5-10 0-5 5-10 21 
Holand 0-5 0-5 10-15 0-5 15-20 31 
Spain 0-5 0-5 0-5 5-10 - 10 
Belgium 0-5 5-10 5-10 0-5 0-5 21 
Ireland 0-5 - 15-20 0-5 10-15 40 
Italy 0-5 0-5 - 0-5 0-5 3 
Portugal 0-5 0-5 0-5 - 10-15 23 
Greece - 0-5 0-5 0-5 0-5 <1 
Source: Financial Stability Report, “Financial unrest in Europe –possible consequences for financial stability in 
Sweden”, January 2010, p. 23. 
    
 The fourth channel, which can contaminate the financial system is that banks resident 
in countries with excessive deficits are holders of government debt. 
 
 
Source: Banca D’Italia, Eurosistema, “Financial Stability Report”, December 2010, p. 20. 
Figure 4. Spread the sovereign CDS and bank in 2010 
 
 Following an analysis of the Euro area, it was found that an increase of 100% 
government bond yield increases of 10-20% corporate bond yields in the euro area as a whole 
(ECB, 2010, p. 77). Moreover, the situation is amplified in the case of banks: government 
intervention from the euro area to support the financial institutions has diminished the 
distinction between sovereign and private debt thereby transferring risk from the banking 
system by governmental sector, which resulted in a close correlation between the spread the 
bank CDS(1) and sovereign. This close relationship resulted in higher spreads of banks, 
resulting in increased financing costs. So, the growth of the yield bonds may weaken the 
banking activity, because of the decreased market value of the portfolio. Approximately 50% 
of long-term bond market are issued by euro area countries and held by banks from the euro 
area, some of them with high levels of exposure to governments. 
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Source: Adrian Blundell-Wignall and Patrick Slovik, “The EU Stress Test and Sovereign Debt Exposures”, 
August 2010, p. 8 
Figure 5. Banks' exposures to sovereign debt of the PIIGS (million Euro) 
 
  Looking at the chart (Table 5, Appendix) above, we see that banks tend to be exposed 
to the sovereign debt of the country resides. This rule is not valid in the case of Ireland, where a 
significant proportion of exposure to public debt is owned by Germany, followed by Great 
Britain. This is another difference of Ireland compared to the four PIGS countries. 
   
  3. Direction of contagion 
  In the early stages of the crisis, France and Germany, the healthy core of Eurozone 
benefited from increased risk aversion. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, states that reacted 
negatively on other sovereigns issuers, have been hit hard by the financial crisis. These countries 
were Austria, Ireland and the Netherlands. Some states have influenced their government balance 
- public budget, to support banks, which improved the concerns regarding the systemic crisis and 
the risk aversion decreased. But the financial crisis has turned into economies with weak fiscal 
outlook and financial tensions. These tensions were most evident in Greece. 
  If we were to give back the main stages of the financial crisis, chronologically and 
spatially, we can distinguish the following steps in drawing the schedule for conducting 
financial crisis: 
 
Launch of the systemic crisis    Systemic outbreak      Systemic reply 
        (07. 2007- 09.2008)                 (10. 2008 – 03.2009)               (04.2009 – 10.2009) 
France, Germany supported                  Austria, Belgium, Ireland       Policy support lead banks 
    by the increased risk                       and Holland, countries with       to reduce risk aversion.  
   aversion send the risks                       financial concerns come 
      to other economies.                                  to the fore.  
 
 
Sovereign risk (11.2009 - present) 
Countries with fiscal problems (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain) 
have an important contribution to the spread of financial crisis (IMF-b, 2010: 7p.) 
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Countries with fiscal problems (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain) have an important 
contribution to the spread of financial crisis (IMF-b, 2010, p. 7) 
Another significant difference between Ireland and the PIGS states is in terms of 
temporal scale deployment financial crisis. Ireland comes to the fore in October 2008, 
contributing to the outbreak of systemic crisis, compared with PIGS states that are emerging 
in the context of the transmission of sovereign risk, until November 2009. 
Regarding the contribution of risk propagation, it can be observed the significant 
contribution of the analyzed states. The main contributors to transfer the sovereign risk are 
Greece and Portugal, followed by Spain and Italy, in order mentioned. 
  
4. Ways of quantifying the financial stability 
The crisis has shown that the system of financial supervision in Europe is inadequate 
scale integrated in EU financial services market. Importance of systemic risks lately led to the 
conclusion that the emphasis should fall on macro-prudential regulation and not on micro-
prudential regulation. Micro-prudential regulation concerns the protection and regulation of 
individual institutions and macro-prudential regulation refers to the risk of collapse of 
financial systems, considered as a whole. It is necessary to have simultaneously two types of 
regulation, because they are interconnected. 
  Indicators of financial stability and systemic risk measures the current level of 
instability and systemic stress. A complete macro-prudential analysis requires that the 
financial stability indicators to be available and relevant to each market and market 
infrastructure, intermediate, and combinations of these components, in the financial sub-
sectors and in the financial system as a whole. Using indicators of systemic risk and financial 
stability of macro-prudential bodies is justified by their typical task of identifying systemic 
risks and issuing warnings about the increased risks. Moreover, the availability of systemic 
stability indicators can serve as an input to identify emergencies. An advantage of these 
indicators is that they can be developed for all relevant systemic intermediaries and markets. 
Moreover, the set of indicators can be expanded relatively rapidly and flexibly, depending on 
the specific problems of interest at some point in time, and in response to innovation and 
structural change in the financial system. This is why macro-prudential authorities should 
have a comprehensive set of indicators of financial stability at their disposal and to 
continuously review and update extensions. 
Composite indicator of systemic stress ("CISS") developed by the European Central 
Bank, allowing real-time monitoring and assessing the level of stress in the financial system, 
also helps to delimit and characterize historical episodes of "financial crisis". This indicator 
could be used to assess the impact of the policy measures to reduce systemic stress levels. For 
current assumptions crisis, and considering the current state of global interconnection of 
economic markets, it is important to analyze the contagion of financial instability. This is 
extremely important to examine in the case of the countries we analyzed.  
Building an aggregate financial stability index (ISF) is one of the quantitative methods 
which measure the stability of a financial system along with early warning systems and stress 
tests. 
Early warning systems allow the predictions of the probability of a financial crisis, but 
does not provide information about the capacity to respond to shocks, respectively that 
techniques such as “stress testing”, which enable comparisons between the performance of 
stability of different periods or between the stability of financial systems. Compared with 
early warning systems, aggregate financial stability index (ISF) offers the possibility of 
making comparisons between different periods and systems and also observe the development 
level of stability. 
Even though this technique is considered simple, rigid and mechanical, it has many 
advantages over other methods: high transparency, can more easily identify the necessary 
statistical data and simplicity of calculations. To determine the ISF is calculated three 
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composite indices – Financial Development Index (IDF), Financial Vulnerability Index (IVF) 
and Financial Soundness Indicators (FSI) – the sum gives rise to aggregate financial stability 
index (ISF). In the event of unavailable data, composite indicator can be calculated as the 
average of available indicators. 
4
4
1
∑
== j
dji
IDF ; 
6
6
1
∑
== j
vji
IVF ; 
5
5
1
∑
== j
sji
FSI  
Thus, individual indicators used in determining composite indicators are: 
(i) for the IDF: Total credit/GDP, Bank margin, Market capitalization/GDP, Banking 
reform and the interest for liberalization; 
(ii.) for IVF: NGO Credit/Total Credit (Reserves/Deposits)/(Cash/M2), Inflation rate, 
Budget deficit/GDP, Loans/Deposits, Bank deposits variation/Variation M2; 
(iii.) for SWFs: Nonperforming Loans/Total Loans, Equity/Total Assets, Regulatory 
capital/Risk-weighted assets, Liquid assets/Total assets (%) ROA (Albulescu, 2009, p. 77).  
Aggregate Financial Stability Index (ISF) is obtained by summing the three composite 
indicators. 
 
Conclusions 
Contagion and spillover models are used primarily to assess cross-transmission of 
financial instability (ECB, 2010, p. 144). A strict definition approach derived from the 
contagion effect is given by Kaminsky and Reinhart and Eichengreen and Rose: “contagion 
effect is the situation where information about the existence of a crisis in another country 
increases the probability of a crisis in the local plan” (Păun, 2010, p. 2).  
Price stability does not ensure financial stability, and not every problem has a fiscal 
origin (eg. Spain), evasion of regulation and supervision of financial markets creates major 
systemic risk and excessive leverage private sector (banks) gives rise to systemic risks. Due to 
the extremely high degree of interconnection within the EU countries, and hence the PIGS 
states, is difficult to stop the contagion between economies of these countries, since the crisis 
and problems in these economies already exists. European framework for financial stability at 
this time is unable to stop the negative effects of contagion, European authorities are currently 
powerless to influence the negative effects of economic downturn spread among the countries 
analyzed. 
Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain are the countries in the Euro zone and adopted the 
single currency euro. This means that adjustments in these countries can be made only by 
fiscal and structural reforms, rather than by adjusting national currency, its devaluation. 
 In our opinion, the best solutions to ensure financial stability objective should take into 
account the contradictions generated by imposing a single currency in countries with different 
fiscal policies. Since the adoption of the euro, the four PIGS states facing budget deficits and 
public debt burden, causes uncertainty in the situation in each country is different, however. 
Italy and Greece, despite the fact that does not comply with the convergence criteria on public 
debt and have high pre-crisis debt, are still supported in the euro area. However, the two 
countries have opted for debt weighting against the adoption of austerity policies, which led to 
a chronic debt situation and the expansion to other states with poor fiscal positions. At the 
same time, importance of systemic risks lately led to the conclusion that the emphasis should 
fall on macro-prudential regulation and not on micro-prudential regulation. But not forget to 
take into account the interrelationship between micro and macro regulations. 
 We believe that, in order to avoid future financial crises, the task of the European 
surveillance currently covering classical, traditional geared more towards regulation and 
legislation, should in future be complemented by surveillance based on identification, 
prevention indicators that quantify financial crisis. 
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Note: 
(1) CDS- Credit Default Swap - is a swap contract in which the protection buyer makes periodic payments 
(spread) to the seller and punching exchange, receives a certain amount if the credit (loan or bond) suffers an 
unexpected event (not reimbursed). 
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 Table 2 
Evolution of the budget deficit in 2006-2011 (% in GDP)(2) 
 
Period 
State 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Portugal -4.6 -3.1 -3.6 -10.2 -9.8 -4.4 
Ireland 2.9 0.1 -7.4 -13.9 -30.9 -13.4 
Italy -3.4 -1.6 -2.7 -5.4 -4.5 -3.9 
Greece -5.7 -6.5 -9.8 -15.6 -10.7 -9.4 
Spain 2.4 1.9 -4.5 -11.2 -9.7 -9.4 
Euro Area -1.3 -0.7 -2.1 -6.3 -6.2 -4.1 
European Union  -1.5 -0.9 -2.4 -6.9 -6.5 -4.4 
Source: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 
 
Table 3 
The evolution of public debt (% in GDP) 2006-2011(3) 
 
Period 
State 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Portugal 69.4 68.4 71.7 83.2 93.5 108.1 
Ireland 24.6 25.1 44.5 64.9 92.2 106.4 
Italy 106.3 103.3 106.1 116.4 119.2 120.7 
Greece 106.1 107.4 112.9 129.7 148.3 170.6 
Spain 39.7 36.3 40.2 53.9 61.5 69.3 
Euro Area 68.6 66.4 70.2 80.0 85.4 87.3 
European Union  61.6 59.0 62.2 74.6 80.0 82.5 
 
Table 4 
Euro area states’ contribution to financial crisis propagation (%) 
 
Contribution from 
 Germany France Italy Spain 
Nether-
lands Belgium Austria Greece Ireland 
Portu-
gal 
Germany - 12 11.1 13.4 4.8 7.4 6.9 19.8 6.2 18.3 
France 5.6 - 13.4 14.8 6 8.1 7.7 18.2 8 18.3 
Italy 4 10.4 - 16.4 3.3 6.8 7.2 24.2 7.2 20.5 
Spain 4.3 10.2 14.4 - 3.3 7 7.4 23.9 8.4 21.1 
Netherlands 4.5 13.2 10.2 12.2 - 8 5.3 22.1 3.3 21.2 
Belgium 4.3 10.3 10.9 12.9 4.6 - 7.6 22.6 8.1 18.8 
Austria 3.8 8.7 10.8 12.5 3 7 - 26.5 6 21.8 
Greece 4.1 7.5 14.2 15.7 4.2 7.8 10.5 - 15.7 20.3 
Ireland 3.1 7.7 9.9 12.8 2 6.8 5.9 31.3 - 20.6 
Co
nt
rib
ut
ion
 to
 
Portugal 4.2 8.5 13.7 15.7 4.6 7.4 10 23.6 12.3 - 
 Total 3.7 8.3 11 12.7 3.4 6.5 7 21.4 8.1 18 
Source: IMF-b, Global Financial Stability Report, “ Meeting New Challenges to Stability and Building a Safer 
System”, april 2010 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2010/01/pdf/text.pdf 
 
 
 
                                                            
(2) Data source for Figure 2. from page 2 
(3) Data source for Figure 3. from page 3 
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Table 5 
Banks' exposures to sovereign debt of the PIIGS (million euro)(4) 
 
Exposure 
State 
The exposure to sovereign debt of Greece 
 
Greece 56,148 
Germany 18,718 
France 11,624 
 
Exposure 
State 
The exposure to sovereign debt of Spain 
 
Spain 203,310 
Germany 31,854 
France 6,592 
 
 
Exposure 
State 
The exposure to sovereign debt of Portugal 
 
Portugal 13,707 
Germany 10,888 
Spain 6,807 
 
Exposure 
State 
The exposure to sovereign debt of Ireland 
Germany 12,922 
United Kingdom 5,580 
Ireland 5,322 
 
Exposure 
State 
The exposure to sovereign debt of Italy 
Italy 144,856 
Germany 72,717 
France 48,185 
Source: Adrian Blundell-Wignall and Patrick Slovik, “The EU Stress Test and Sovereign Debt Exposures”, 
August 2010, p. 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
(4) Data source for Figure 5. from p. 5. 
